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STATE OF UTAH 
BANK OF COMMERCE, a Utah bank-
ing corporation, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, Case No. 
vs. 11665 
F. LELAND SEELY, et al., 
Defendant and Appellant. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
This is a suit for breach of a promissory note signed, 
executed and delivered to the appeHant and for the re-
covery of principal, interest and attorneys' fees thereon. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The trial court granted the respondent's Motion for a 
Summary Judgment declaring that as the result of the 
appellant's defau]t on a promissory note respondent was 
entitled to recover principal, interest and attorneys' fees. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The respondents seek affirmance of the summary 
judgment. 
2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The appellant's statement of facts is not complete. It 
is not based on or referenced to iJhe record, nor does re- 1 
spondent agree with appellant's istatement that no insitruc-
tions were given concerning the disposition of the proceeds 
of the note. Appellant also, throughout his statement of 
the facts makes reference to tJhe conduct of a James Jamie-
son. The statements of Jamieson and his conduct are not 
relevant. This will be discussed in respondent's argument. 
Therefore the respondent submits the following statement 
of fact. 
On or about May 10, 1965 appellant F. Leland Seely, 
with his son, Glen Seely, came to the respondent bank and 
made, executed and delivered to the bank for valuable con-
sideration a certain promissory note in the principal sum 
of $25,000.00 with interest thereon at the rate of 6% per 
annum due and payable six months from the date thereof. 
(R. 28, 37). At the time tfue note was signed appellant in· 
structed C. R. Canfield, Vice President of said respondent 
bank, to take the proceeds of the note and give a cashier's 
check payable to his son Glen in the amount of $5,000.00 
and deposit the balance of the proceeds of $20,000.00 in the 
account of Galaxy Realty, a corporation, the president of 
which was at that time Glen Seely. Thereafter appellant 
endorsed a check and left it with the bank. (R. 28, 33, 41, 
44). 
Thereafter on November 29, 1965 a renewal note was 
signed for $25,000.00 extending the time for payment on 
the original noite. (R. 37). Following this other renewal 
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notes dated May 20, 1966, December 16, 1966, October 17, 
1967 and June 6, 1968 were executed inasmuch as the prior 
notes were in default. When the renewal note of December 
16, 1966 was in default, respondent agreed not to bring suit 
agilinst the appellant if he and his wife would siign a re-
newal note dated October 17, 1967. It was contemplated 
Lhat this note would be secured by real property in Box 
Elder County, Utah. However, the security interest was 
never perfected. (R. 29). All of 'tJhe said promissory notes 
with the exception of the original note of May 10, 1965 and 
the note of October 17, 1967 had the words "Renewal" 
written or typed on the face of the instrument. (R. 31, 36, 
37). When 1the note of May 20, 1966 was executed, the 
interest rate on the same was increased to 61/2 percent. 
Likewise, when the note of June 6, 1968 was executed, the 
interest rate was increased to 71;2 percenlt. (R. 31, 37). As 
11 result of appeHant's default on the note of June 6, 1968, 
appellant commenced this suit. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
1. The Judgment Granting Recovery on the Promis-
sory Note is Fully Supported by the Record and the Law. 
2. The Trial Court Was Correct in Denying Appel-
lant's Oral Motion for Leave to Amend His Answer. 
ARGUMENT 
1. THE JUDGMENT GRANTING RECOVERY 
ON THE PROMISSORY NOTE IS FULLY SUP-
PORTED BY THE RECORD AND THE LAW. 
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Rule 56 ( c) of the UtaJh Rule,<; of Civil Procedure, sum. 
marized, requires that two elements be satisfied before 
summary judgment will be granted. 
1. There is no genuine issues as to any material fact. 
2. The moving party is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law. 
In analyzing :the evidence on appeal to determine the 
validity of a summary judgment, this court has stated in 
1 
Thompson v. Ford Motor Company, 16 Utah 2d 30, 395 P. 
2d 63 ( 1964) : 
"On summary judgment the adverse party is en· 
tWed to have the court survey the evidence and all 
reasonable inferences fairly to be drawn therefrom 
in the light most favorable to him." 
As a method of determining whether any genuine issue 
of any fact exists, respondent has compared the 
allegations of its complaint and suppo:rli!ing affidavit filed 
by C. R. Canfield wilth the answer on file herein and the 
affidavits of Glen and F. Leland Seely. In making said 
comparison the following uncontroverted £.acts in the chron-
ological order of the case become apparent: 
1. Glen M. Seely and appellant went to the respondent 
Bank of Commerce on or about May 10, 1965 and signed 
and delivered to the bank a promissory note in the sum of 
$25,000.00 payable in six (6) months from the date thereof 
at the rate of six ( 6) percent 1interest. (R. 28, 37). 
2. The proceeds of the nrote were paid a1s follows: A 
$5,000.00 cashier's check payable to Glen Seely and $20,. 
5 
000.00 deposited to the accourut of Galaxy Realty, a corpora-
tion, the president of which was at that time Glen M. Seely, 
son of the appellant. (R. 28). 
3. At the same time and place as the note of May 10, 
J 965 was SJigned, appellant endorsed a check and left the 
check with Mr. C. R. Canfield. (R. 41, 44). 
4. That at the time the promissory note fell due, Glen 
M. Seely delivered $5,000.00 to the hank, picked up a re-
newal note, took irt rto the appellant, who signed it. (R. 41, 
42). 
5. Renewal notes were signed and delivered to the 
bank by appellant on November 29, 1965 in the sum of 
$25,000.00 and thereafter on May 20, 1966 and December 
16, 1966, each in the 'Sum of $20,000.00. However, the note 
of May 20 wa;s for interest at six ( 6%) percent while the 
note of December 16 was for inter&<;t at six and one-half 
percent. (R. 29, 37, 44). 
6. The renewa,l note of December 16, 1966 was in 
default and respondent 'agreed not to bring suit on the same 
in return for appellanlt and his wife executing a renewal 
note dated October 17, 1967 in the amount of $19,000.00. 
It was contemplated that this note would be secured by 
real property located in Box Elder County, Utah. (R. 29, 
36, 44). 
7. Appellant executed a bank authorization card 
authorizing respondent to contract for credit or group life 
insurance. (R. 29, 38). 
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8. On June 6, 1968, appellant executed and delivered 
to plaintiff a promissory note in the amount of $19,000.00 
with interest thereon rut the rate of seven ( 7 % ) percent 
which note was due and payable on or before December 6 
' 1968. (R. 16, 23). 
In 'appellant's brief reference is made to a James 
Jamieson. Inasmuch as the aHegation as to his conduct 
and activity were prior to the time the original note of 
May 10, 1965 was executed, they are irrelevant and not a 
"material fact" necessary for the determination of this 
case. The above uncontroverited facts clearly show that 
all of the essential requirements for a valid, negotiable 
instrument were met. Inasmuch as appellant has not raised 
any questions concerning the negotiability of the instru-
ment, respondenrt will not discuss this matter further. 
The appellant's brief on page 5 states iJhat their sole 
affirmative defense is one of "no consideration". Respon-
dent in its complaint in paragraph 2 (R. 16) alleged that 
a promissory note of June 6, 1968 was given for valuable 
consideration by the appellant. The appellant, in his an-
swer ( R. 23) specifically denies consideration as to his 
wife, Grace Seely. However, it is unclear as to whether 
the appellant denies consideration as to himself. In the 
appellant's first and sole affirmative defense denial again 
is made specifically in respect to his wife. The denial as to 
the appellant is not clear and is couched as follows: 
"That thi,s is a lack of consideration for the obliga-
tion allegedly owed by defendants, and the note is 
void and without effect." ( R. 23). 
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Interpreting this -statement most favombly to appellant, 
the question of lack of consideration would appear to be an 
issue in the case. Determination must, therefore, be made 
as to whether this issue is one of a genuine material fact; 
or is a question of law. 
In 11 Am. Jur. 2d, Bills and Notes, § 216, it states: 
"Consideration is not always a fact question. If all 
facts concerning the issue of consideration are with-
out dispute, such issue becomes a question of law." 
On page 7 of the appellant's brief, ce!'tain fact.a are 
set forth as in direct opposition. Upon a comparison 
of these facts with the record b€fore the court, the follow-
ing should be noted: 
1. It is immaterial who applied for the Ioan. The 
fa0ts are clear that F. Leland Seely signed the original 
promissory note of May 10, 1965 and a series of renewal 
notes thereafter. (R. 28, 29, 40, 41). 
2. The allegations as to Jamieson again are not rele-
,-ant in thi-s case inasmuch as they go to events prior to the 
execution of the note. 
3. The only issue raised by the pleadings and the 
record in this case concerns whether or not consideration 
was given by the appellant for the note which he executed. 
No dispute exists as to how the proceeds of the loan were 
to be distributed. (R. 28). The question of who gave in-
structions is therefore immaterial ina-smuch as the facts 
are clea1· that tlhe ,appellant received value for the promise 
to pay, that value being reflected in the way in which the 
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proceeds were distributed, and the fact that he endorser! 
a check at the time of execution of the original note. (R. 
41, 44). 
Since all facts concerning the issue of consideration 
are therefore without dispute, a determination must now 
be made as to whether respondent is entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law. 
Appellant argues throughout his brief that the bank 
is not a holder in due corse and therefore subject to the 
defense of lack of consideration. Argument is also made 
that the bank was the party accommodated. A question of 
whether or not the bank was a holder in due course need 
not be considered by the Court inasmuch as it is not the 
position of the respondent that it was a holder in due 
course. The question of an accommodation party is also 
not an issue because under no ·circumstances could the facts 
be interpreted to hold that the bank was the party accom· 
modated. The accommodation would have to go to a third 1 
party to the instrument such as Glen Seely or Jamieson. 
The facts would indicated that appellant was an accommo· 
dation maker and therefore his !liability would be the same 
as that of any other maker of a negotiable instrument. See 
11 Am. Jur. 2d, Bills and Notes, § 539; Utah Code Anno· 
tated, 1953, 44-1-30, repealed January 1, 1966, but subsfan· 
tially re-enacted in the Utah Uniform Commercial Code, 
Section 3-415. 
Respondent contends that in at least three particulars 
consideration was given by the appellant for the note of 
June 6, 1968: 
l. Extension of Time. The note of June 6, 1968 was 
the last renewal note in a chain of renewals dating from 
the ol'iginal note execulted and delivered on May 10, 1965 
and the consideration for it came from renewal notes given 
by the appellant to extend the payment of time on the orig-
inal obligation. It is clear from the weighlt of authorities 
that an extension of time for the payment of a note is con-
sideration. This pooition is set forth clearly in 11 Am. J ur. 
2d, Bills and Notes, § 230 wherein it s·taJtes: 
"Extension of time for the payment of an existing 
legal obligation is consideraJtion for an undertaking 
on commercial paper as to all who sign it, whether 
the undertaking is by the one owing the original 
obligation or a third person, ... " 
Each of the renewal notes subsequent to the original 
note, with the exception of the note of Octolber 17, 1967 
had written across its face, either in hand or by typewriter, 
the word "Renewal". The only inference that can be drawn 
from this fact is that the renewal notes were executed to 
give to appellant an extension of time for payment of the 
balance of the due and owing on the original ob-
ligation. Furthermore, consideration for an extension of 
time for commercial paper may also be shown where an 
agreement to pay a higher rate of interest is execwted. See 
also 11 Am. Jur. 2d, Bills and Notes, § 303. Again, the rec-
ord shows clearly that on at least two occasions renewal 
notes were issued at a higher interest figure, to-wit: De-
c:em ber 16, 1966 increased to 61;2 % (R. 37); June 6, 1968 
increased to 7%. (R. 31). 
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2. Forbearance To Sue. Ju&t as an extension of time 
may be consideration for a promise on commercial paper, 
so actual forbearance or a promise to forbear rto sue on 
a claim shall be adequate consideration for a promise on 
commeroiaI paper. Authori,ty for thris position is set forth 
clearly in 11 Am. Jur. 2d, Bills and Notes, § 230: 
"Similar to an extension of time, actual forbear-
ance or a promise or agreement to forbear to sue 
on a da1im on which lthe creditor has a right to sue, 
or to exercise any legal right is consideration for 
a promise on commercial paper ... " 
'I1he record is clear that the renewal of October 17, 1967 
was signed because the bank had agreed not to bring suit 
against F. Leland Seely for his delinquency on the note of 
December 16, 1966 which was in default. (R. 29). 
3. Part Payment. 11 Am. Jur. 2d, Bills and Notes, 
§ 303, 1is authority for the proposition that a payment be-
fore maturity of a part of the amount of the instrument, 
either principal or interest, is sufficient consideration for 
the extension of payment. This factor is also present in 
this case inasmuch as $5,000.00 was paid by Glen Seely at 
the time the origiinal note fell due. (R. 41, 44). 
2. THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN 
DENYING APPELLANT'S ORAL M 0 TI 0 N 
FOR LEA VE TO AMEND HIS ANSWER. 
During the argument on respondent's motion for sum-
mary judgment, appellant made a motion to amend his 
answer so that other facts could he pleaded. (R. 10). 
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Rule 15 (a) of the U.R.C.P. allows amendment only 
when justice so requires. This d&tennination ii:; witMn the 
discretion of the court. 
Since no written amendment was proposed it is diffi-
cult to know the content of the proposed amendment. Ap-
parently it was to tJhe activities of J 1amieson. (R. 10). Since 
this is the only indication of the proposal given by counsel 
for appellant, nothing new or of sU:bstance would have been 
contained in the amendment, nor would tbe amendment 
have resulted in any i:;U:bstantial in lthe issues. 
Therefore, according to Dupler v. Yates, 10 Utah 2d 
251, 351 P. 2d 624, 637 the decision of the trial court was 
correct: 
"While rule 15 (a) U.R.C.P. provides that leave to 
amend shaH be freely giiven when justice so requires 
the liberality of the rule is not without limit par-
ticularly when nothing new or of substance is con-
tained in the proposed amendment. The permitting 
of amendments to pleadings rests in the sound dis-
cretion of the trial court and we find no abui:;e of 
that discretion in this case. 
"Furthermore, an unverified amendment of a plead-
ing should not be allowed ito defeat a motion for 
summary judgment if the amendment did not effect 
any substantial change in the issues that were orig-
inally formulated in the pleadings." 
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CONCLUSION 
The Motion for Summary Judgment was properly 
granted because there is no genuine issue of any material 
fact in ·the oase at bar. The plaintiff was, as a matter of 
law, eniflirtled to the judgment granted. 
Respectfully submitted, 
MABEY, BRADFORD & 
MARSDEN 
EZRA T. CLARK, JR. 
1700 University Club Building 
Salt Lake Oity, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
and Respondent 
